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Abstract. Co-locating multiple tenants’ virtual machines (VMs) on the
same host underpins public clouds’ affordability, but sharing physical
hardware also exposes consumer VMs to side channel attacks from ad-
versarial co-residents. We demonstrate passive bandwidth measurement
to perform traffic analysis attacks on co-located VMs. Our attacks do
not assume a privileged position in the network or require any communi-
cation between adversarial and victim VMs. Using a single feature in the
observed bandwidth data, our algorithm can identify which of 3 poten-
tial YouTube videos a co-resident VM streamed with 66% accuracy. We
discuss defense from both a cloud provider’s and a consumer’s perspec-
tive, showing that effective defense is difficult to achieve without costly
under-utilization on the part of the cloud provider or over-utilization on
the part of the consumer.
Keywords: Cloud Privacy · Encrypted Communication Analysis · Net-
work Virtualization · Side Channel · Traffic Analysis
1 Introduction
In response to an increasingly digital age, researchers have developed crypto-
graphic protocols to protect cyber-privacy. However, the gap between protocols’
physical implementations and the theoretical context in which they are usu-
ally considered introduces the potential for side channel attacks. Side channels
are flows of information exposed by the physical implementation of a system
and typically not included in any proofs of security [8]. For example, despite
the encryption SSH performs on each keystroke, Song et al. extracted about 1
bit of information per pair of keystrokes from timing information on when the
keystrokes were sent [9].
The rise of cloud computing exacerbates the threat that side channels pose.
Cloud providers issue customers virtual machines (VMs), often co-locating dif-
ferent customers’ VMs to increase resource utilization and amortize costs. Thus,
†Authors Agarwal and Murale contributed equally to this work.
a customer’s VM may be placed on the same host as a different, potentially
adversarial VM. Ristenpart et al. and others have shown that a co-resident ad-
versary can leverage this sharing of a physical platform, particularly the shared
caches, to compromise the isolation of a victim’s VM [5,7].
Our contributions. This paper examines the network interface side channel. We
empirically demonstrate load measurement and behavior profiling on two com-
mercial cloud environments: DigitalOcean and the Massachusetts Open Cloud.
Our raw data collection component is available in an open-source repository.4
Our experimental setup involves a malicious VM, denoted Flooder, that
saturates the network interface to put its bandwidth in contention with that of
the targeted co-resident customer’s VM, Victim. Data from test trials helped
calibrate Flooder’s observations to estimate Victim’s load over time. Such
data can be used to determine when a competitor’s traffic spikes or learn statis-
tics about a cloud environment that doesn’t publish its utilization.
The raw data becomes more valuable when paired with encrypted commu-
nications analyses to determine, for example, which website Victim is visiting.
After test trials had trained a classification algorithm, we showed the algorithm
could identify which YouTube video Victim was streaming with 66% accuracy
compared to 33% for random guessing. This result represents a macro-approach
relying on estimating bandwidth instead of the usual micro-approach of collect-
ing individual packets. Thus, we do not require Flooder to have a privileged
position on the network or any kind of affiliation with the cloud provider.
By contrast, previous work was conducted on local testbeds and furthermore
required a malicious client to remain connected toVictim on the order of seconds
to reliably measure throughput [1]. This limited potential targets to web or media
servers that offered large downloads publicly. The single long connection cannot
be substituted simply with short, repeated ones if Victim uses DDoS protection.
Our threat model imposes no such restriction.
2 Environments
We consider two cloud tenants: an honest Victim and a malicious Flooder. As
the name suggests, Flooder sends as many packets as the network can process;
various choices for packet sizes, sleep times, and internet protocols are described
in Section 3.
We assume that the cloud provider is a trusted entity whose switch usage
data isn’t directly published. Additionally, we assume that the cloud provider is
unaffiliated with adversaries, so Flooder cannot directly request co-residency
with Victim. However, researchers have demonstrated indirect achievement of
co-residency with specific victims on commercial clouds [1, 4, 7]. Therefore, we
presume here that co-residency is achievable and build from there. We consider
4 scenarios.
4https://github.com/YatharthROCK/primes-data-collection
Environment A Victim and Flooder occupied different MacBook Pros con-
nected via ethernet to the same LAN network. Both Victim and Flooder
connected to clients over the internet via a 10 MB/s downlink.
Environment B Victim and Flooder occupied different physical Sun v20z
servers running Ubuntu 16.04 x64, and both connected to clients on the same
LAN via a dedicated switch capable of a throughput of 12 MB/s.
Environment C Victim and Flooder ran as different processes on a $10/mo
VM running Ubuntu 14.04 x64 on DigitalOcean, a production cloud. Both
connected to clients on different VMs in the same data center, NYC-2.
Environment D Victim and Flooder occupied co-located m1.medium VMs
running Ubuntu 14.04 x64 on the Massachusetts Open Cloud (MOC), a
production cloud environment. Both connected to different clients with a
throughput on the order of 40 MB/s.
3 Load Measurement
With an increase in Victim’s network activity, we observed a corresponding
decrease in Flooder’s throughput in all four environments described above,
including two production clouds. We confirmed an inversely linear relationship
and, on the basis of test runs, calibrated a tool to output an estimate forVictim’s
load based on Flooder’s observations (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Inverse linear relationship between Victim’s and Flooder’s throughput (in
green and blue respectively). Left shows data collected in Environment C; Right
shows data collected in Environment D. Right additionally overlays (in red) Flooder
throughput in a follow-up trial without Victim activity. Note that the fluctuations in
Flooder’s throughput due to Victim’s activity are distinguishably larger than those
caused by unrelated environmental factors.
Data collection used TCP instead of UDP. UDP sent packets fast enough
to congest the network and thus achieved very low goodput. Having Flooder
sleep between transmissions of UDP packets improved goodput until a point,
after which goodput decreased again. We were not able to saturate the network
interface enough with UDP for Victim’s and Flooder’s bandwidth to be in
contention.
Data was collected using 4000-byte packets as we determined this packet
size resulted in the most consistent bandwidth across trials. Consistency in the
bandwidth aids in distinguishing fluctuations in Flooder’s bandwidth caused
by Victim’s activity from those caused by unrelated environmental factors. Even
then, environmental noise was significantly higher in Environment D than in
Environments A, B, and C.
4 Profiling
Correlating data gathered from side channels with known behaviors makes the
data much more meaningful. We demonstrate that the continuous estimate of
Victim’s load from our tool in the previous section can serve as a foundation
for encrypted communication analysis.
We considered the case of streaming 4K YouTube videos and observed ‘band-
width fingerprints’ unique to the video being streamed (see Figure 2(a)). Vari-
able bitrate (VBR) technology, which lets a higher bitrate be allocated to more
complex segments of media files, contributes to this phenomenon [2].
We trained our classification algorithm on 60 trials of 3 different videos using
the feature of delays between bandwidth dips. After recursively weighing the
importance of the dips, we fit the learning data with 75% accuracy. On a new
set of 60 trials, the trained algorithm achieved an accuracy of 66% compared to
the 33% accuracy of random guessing (see Figure 2(b)).
(a) Victim load while streaming the same
video in multiple trials.
(b) ROC curves for our algorithm (“33-66”
curve represents random classification).
Fig. 2. Classification of YouTube video in environment A.
This result attests to the feasibility of determining which YouTube video
Victim streamed with passive load measurement in the cloud as well as of ap-
plying other encrypted communication analysis attacks like those demonstrated
by Dyer, Miller and others [3, 6, 9, 10].
5 Counter-measures and Future Vision
Each of the three agents that participate in this paper’s threat model (the cloud
provider, the victim, and the adversary) face trade-offs in defending or executing
the presented attack.
A Cloud Provider’s Perspective. A provider has incentive to protect the privacy
of customers’ information as loss of trust translates into loss of business. However,
this can be at odds with overall utilization and thus the economies of scale offered
by the cloud. Perfect co-resident isolation could be achieved, for example, by
dedicating a network port to each VM, but this would be prohibitively expensive,
especially for VMs that are relatively small compared to the host. Future work
exploring this tradeoff would seek to identify what level of network isolation
is required (such as switch- or hypervisor-based methods) to render network
flooding attacks ineffective in specific scenarios.
A second approach would be to automatically detect flooding activity within
the cloud. Cloud providers could then thwart the attack by terminating suspi-
cious VMs, migrating them to another host, or rate limiting their traffic. Each
option comes with its own tradeoffs: terminating a VM without notice could vi-
olate service level agreements, migrating VMs could be prohibitively costly and
would not prevent the VM from attacking any tenants on its new host, and rate
limiting would need to balance network utilization with privacy protection.
A Customer’s Perspective. A tenant on a cloud can thwart attackers’ attempts
by preventing them from becoming co-located with his or her VMs [7]. To achieve
this, he or she can provision VMs so as to consume the resources of an entire
physical host or take advantage of host isolation options like Amazon EC2’s
Dedicated Hosts. Many clouds including the MOC allow customers to create
affinity groups which preferentially co-locate their own machines. Alternatively,
customers can try to mask their signal by adding bandwidth noise, though this
can be difficult to do efficiently and might incur additional costs [3].
An Adversary’s Perspective. Improving the presented attack encompasses in-
creasing the accuracy and precision of the data gathered via the flooding tech-
nique as well as improving the analysis of that data. Using UDP instead of
TCP to flood Victim promises improvements due to UDP’s statelessness, al-
lowing increased control over packet timing and size. Additionally, having a
malicious client connect directly to Victim, as done in [1], would help to con-
trol for environmental fluctuation in Flooder’s client’s throughput. To work
around provider rate limits, a promising avenue of research includes micro-bursts,
flooding for brief periods of time, as well as using multiple Flooders working
together. In terms of analysis, a more intelligent classifier trained on a greater
number of features would allow for more accurate YouTube video identification,
especially as the number of videos Victim could potentially have streamed in-
creases.
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